

SUMMARY DAY 1 - 17 SEPTEMBER 2020

By Prof Dries Velthuisen (UNISA)

Prof K. Aning. Keynote 1.

Rethinking Africa's ungoverned spaces: past and new notions within the context of West Africa

What are referred to as “ungoverned spaces” are in some cases such as in West Africa, spaces governed by non-state actors. In that space the state is only one actor among many together with informal structures such as traditional systems who applies unwritten rules and takes care of people in the reality of that space. Although it is mostly applicable to rural areas, some urban areas are difficult for governments to penetrate. Therefore, some traditional systems established themselves in urban spaces. What is professed is “hybrid domains of peace, security and justice” with integration of systems the main characteristic.

Dr E. Kleynhans.

War, Opportunism and Ungoverned Spaces: A Case Study of the Rehoboth Rebellion, 1915

History cases such as the rebellion in the Rehoboth Gebiet during April 1915 show that when state control is absent, people within that space exploit the freedom of action to look after their own interests and self-determination even developing militias for self-protection. It leaves sovereign states feels threatened, who then reverts military intervention to fill power vacuums. The result is violence and counter-violence between community and state. Criminal opportunism develops during conflict while community needs for self-governance is not addressed.

EPON Panel: Prof Mandrup, Dr Fiifi Edu-Afful and Dr Linda Darkwa

- *Peace-missions in a non-permissive environment – the case of Somalia*
- *Negotiating Governance in Ungoverned Spaces: The Agency of Peace Support Operations*
- *Peacekeeping on a Knife's Edge: Unmasking the Realities of Violent Extremism in United Nations Missions*

Lessons learned from missions in Somalia and Mali confirms that capacity building for democratic governance, and humanitarian aspects should be a priority for critical response in spaces governed by informal interest groups. People on peripheries of society are not “ungoverned” but is rather viewed as undesirable elements of society and then neglected by governments as victims of armed violence. Cleavages and mistrust remain because of multilevel corruption of the formal system. The social contract becomes irrelevant to marginalised people because there are no coherent, integrated policies for service delivery and democratic activities.

The case of AMISOM and the UN missions in Somalia show that military deployments provide only a temporary solution to violent extremism. An extremist grouping such as Al-Shabaab is omnipresent and in control despite peace missions. The spaces where the peace missions operate remain contested beyond formal governance. UN/AU partnerships proved to be ineffective in dealing with violent non-

state actors and criminals because of ineffective communication between the organisations, TCCs, especially neighbouring countries, having direct national interest in missions that is not always aligned to that of the mission and in practice, troops remain under command of the country of origin. Sharing of intelligence and logistical support is problematic as it always is in peace missions. Missions do not always have the mandate to deal with violent extremism or able to adapt tactics when situations change. Peacekeepers find it difficult to get along with local actors (trust building required). Population rather collaborate with “spoilers” and armed groups than with peace missions. It is found that the UN cannot deal with violent extremism beyond protection tasks. The opinion is that missions need smarter mandates that allow for improved community engagement, development collaboration, integrated approaches and better coordination aligned to formal governance agendas. Development of intervention brigades remains a useful option to contribute to the temporary combatting of violent extremism while diplomatic and developmental efforts, continue.

Panel discussion: Mr Zane Cleophas, Ms Noelle Cowling & Mr Neill Goslett

The role of technology and cyber matters in assisting with governance

Our speakers identified Cyberspace as a specific ungoverned space that requires improved governance. Some countries in Africa have good capacity but technical capabilities remains low-tech and reliant on foreign powers, who selectively share intelligence on conflict situations to suit their own agendas. Some states have the capacity to monitor areas of interest, including EEZs, as ungoverned spaces to promote their national interest but only powerful states and non-state actors are capable of Cyber Warfare. Policies and strategies on Cyber security are not always developed by all countries. Regional and layered approaches aiming at clever but simple interventions are required to secure African states against Cyber Warfare, beyond just legislation towards strategic implementation.

A new paradigm is unfolding that requires from communities of practice in peace, security, and justice to engage in broader participation with civil society and actors in undemocratic spaces, involving them in security management as equal partners. The people who dwell in spaces where violent extremism occurs know best about what is required to bring lasting peace. For lasting peace, democratic governance is required that build on relationships between formal state structures, informal community, and societal structures as well as extensive collaborative networks of the willing while not excluding those with capacity to support. Until then the application of military force, will remain a blunt instrument of power, controlled by the states as part of ineffective multilateral arrangements. The meaningful application of military force will remain dependant on external wealth, to be applied in the interest of nation states as a temporary solution to re-establish democratic governance.

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SUMMARY OF DAY 2 - 18 SEPTEMBER 2020

By Prof Thomas Mandrup SIGLA / RDDC

Professor Tim Muriti

Regional Reconciliation in Africa’s Ungoverned Spaces & Securing the Pan-African Aerospace: The Role of Academia in Analysing the US Navy’s “Unidentified” Aerial Phenomena

Reconciliation in ungoverned spaces is needed but states are not the best levels of analysis and where to focus to address a matter originating from and impacting on the wider geopolitical landscape. The regional level is particularly important as threats are rarely confined to a single state or remain within its boundaries. The AU has taken a range of initiatives related to regionalization that can be found in the 2063 framework. Inherently the AU's frameworks for security recognize and build upon stable regions to give expression to the security the AU envisions for the continent. The AU Non-aggression and Defence Pact from 2009 is particularly important. In addition to the status quo there is a need for a working group on Pan-African Aerospace security matters. This relates to threats from the outside and with reference to an increase in threats from high-velocity UAVs. Within the African context this is a neglected security domain. Future research is required and focused working or research groups attending to aerospace threats and vulnerabilities should be established. (See SIGLA [Conference site](#) for presentations)

Mr Eeben Barlow

Professional private security contractors: Stabilising ungoverned spaces in Africa.

PMSCs operate in ungoverned spaces. The term ungoverned remains contested, but found everywhere also at sea. The main threat comes from anti-government forces (AGFs) that bring about costs for everybody: economy, instability, failure. Foreign powers are problematic as well and often do nothing more than window dressing. Ungoverned spaces are problematic for many reasons and security forces cannot solve this dilemma. In too many instances governments have no national strategy – they do not know where they need to go and why? AGFs are everywhere and have become increasingly advanced. Governments and institutions have neglected the threat which makes it more dangerous. AGFs establish alternative government structures and this is a self-enforcing phenomenon as this practice scares off foreign investment. Fear mongering and fake news scare the population giving rise to people in these areas having to choose to flee or join the AGFs. This further reinforces the view locally of the government if it is problematic from the outset.

The foreign scramble for Africa is ongoing. PMSCs can assist the local government structures and add value to local law enforcement. Here the emphasis must be on African professional companies to assist with African solutions. One example is how STTEP is integrated into the Ugandan army to assist with certain missions. One major conundrum is the role of foreign trainers that governments bring in while local knowledge is often much better to offer elements of information. PMSCs can build local trust, provide simple technologies with quick impact projects while better suited to access and secure control in the black holes where formal governance is weak or absent.

Some suggestions are: use the knowledge on the continent and not look outside, take responsibility for what is going on and this includes when matters are not going well. Mozambique and the DR Congo are two cases in point - we are there, matters are complex, but how to handle the complexities remain ambivalent. DRC's exposure to AGFs is a longstanding problem and the UN should have been able to stop this as they have the mandate in DRC.

Intel remains critical, but good intel is often ignored if it does not conform to the established or preferred intelligence picture. Foreign presence and assistance remain problematic. The recent Mali coup could not have taken place on its own without foreign elements. Political will and ego's remain major stumbling blocks alongside the idea of what is rapid intervention based on common understandings and doctrine. Overall, the AU is out of step with rapid intervention.

Dr Troels Henningsen

The dilemmas of the hybrid security assemblage in Mali.

No space is ungoverned and one should therefore consider the matter of hybrid security assemblages as a way to unpack and understand the analysis of what governance transpires in such spaces. Assemblages are composed of a range of actors that includes external interveners or local groups, but not just military actors. Criminal groups, ethnic self-defence militias, insurgents, militant Jihadists, state agencies, and international interveners cooperate, compete, or clash due to their diverging objectives, but they all attempt to influence the situation. Of those actors, the state is still the reference point in the assemblage of human security in northern Mali. Ungoverned spaces do not mean that the state is not present; merely that governance is conducted through less than efficient ways of informal security and clientelism.

The [Algiers Agreement in itself](#) reflects a network of actors and an inherent tension about localized governance that in effect transpires as rule of force instead of rule of law. The alliances of militant Jihadist groups and newly organized ethnic self-defence militias add further tension and galvanize the logic of rule of force. Even the several missions undertaken by intervening actors (or collections) too often pursue diverging objectives. Insecurity is thus not a single-matter outcome with assemblage offering a way of seeing security dynamics in its totality. It helps with mission design and to determine with some accuracy whether we are doing the right thing. It allows local actors to enter and set up a dialogue, but this is often a contentious matter. In the case of Mali, the concept of hybrid security assemblage could be an analytical tool for external interveners to identify the negative synergies of overlapping and conflicting security governance attempts. In addition, it highlights the many dilemmas inherent in interventions in “multi-governed” spaces, such as how cooperation with local security providers might create everyday security to citizens but might threaten to undermine the state. (See SIGLA Conference site for presentation).

Dr Hüseyin Yücel

Governance and blue crime in the Gulf of Guinea.

The speaker has worked on security governance in the Gulf of Guinea and the implementation of projects under the Danish Peace and Stabilization Fund.

The primary focus relates to how cooperation on fighting blue crime within the Yaoundé Code of Conduct (YCC) can be strengthened. While the Yaoundé structure is often portrayed as a hierarchy, it is better understood as a network of intertwined actors, as this understanding better reflect the legally unbinding characteristic of the system while paying attention to the signatory state’s reluctance to yield sovereignty.

Blue crime is a serious issue in the Gulf of Guinea. Transnational organized crime such as kidnapping and piracy, illegal fishing and related crimes continue to threaten beneficial use of the sea. The YCC set up zones for the Gulf of Guinea that broadly converge with national jurisdictions of national actors along its coastline to share information and act when called upon. This is necessary, as blue crime in the Gulf of Guinea is inherently a transnational issue: Seas are communal, require cross-jurisdictional aspects of rule of law, and pirates and other criminals do not respect boundaries. Root causes persist to foster maritime threats because they are not addressed and left to fester.

The YCC is essentially an information sharing structure that can act as a force multiplier to augment countermeasures. States remain the primary actors on maritime crime and maritime law enforcement happens with their capacities and within their legal frameworks. Therefore, it is highly problematic that most states lack the maritime capacity to act on incidents of maritime crime, that states have not ratified law concerning anti-blue crime measures, and that the lines of communication between states and the zonal Multilateral Maritime Coordination Centers (MMCCs) are not always clear. The promise of the YCC is a more effective response to maritime crime, but without effective lines of communication with other actors in the structure, there is still a long way to go.

The YCC structure is promising – but needs to be more pragmatic and workable. Priorities must be set. The networks are not well-implemented, and the national focal points do not work as expected. It also lacks the optimal mix of international staff to bring about the required cross-national functionalities. What needs to be done is to grow the YCCs multinational staff complement in and around national focal points. The existing framework should first be optimized and implemented more decisively before considering expansion.

Mr Joao Feijo

From military stalemate to humanitarian drama: Learning from history and rethinking intervention in Cabo Delgado (CD).

Social and political background in CD reflects a move from military stalemate to development. Historical trend for CD is one of disintegrated regional religious and other groups. CD is also the region where liberation struggle originated in the 1960s. After liberation from colonial rule started a (civil) war between Renamo and Frelimo. Then and now, poverty and limit access to socio-political participation remain an issue. On the other hand there are historical differences between the Makonde in the mountains, Catholics and former fighters, and mwanis on the coast, mostly muslims and with a sense of exclusion from power resources, such as education, employment and pensions from the State. Targets of the current insurgency are government's institutions, civil servants, local businessmen and warehouses, while the security forces (including the Army) have lost the initiative, and strategic points and even cities/settlements. The army struggle with deserting soldiers and lack proper equipment. The Dyck Advisory Group is assisting but appears to be more of a media campaign about progress. Consequences of attacks are visible in the estimated 200-300.000 IDP's, humanitarian impact, and housing destroyed.

Learning from the past offers some insight. 1964-74 – the liberation struggle. 1977-92 (civil war predominantly between FRELIMO and RENAMO till 84). 2015-16 RENAMO and FRELIMO including the Machababos (the young) – 2017-20 coming into the picture. It now shows ethnic, class, and generational fault lines with an external influence seeing war as a profitable business. Drugs and crime play roles as well in the overall understanding of who benefits and why profits as on offer. Mozambican businessmen suspected of involvement with drug traffic become known also for the financing of political campaigns of the ruling party FRELIMO. Momade Bachir Sulemane, for instance, is on the US list of drug crimes, but no actions taken in Mozambique and he lives in Maputo, can move freely and has close connections with important political figures. Fuminho, a Brazilian cocaine dealer wanted by INTERPOL, was found in Maputo, living for months in a luxury hotel. The extradition process was very fast, leaving the suspicion of lack of political will to investigate its networks in Mozambique.

Mr Dave Bax

Mozambique – voices from the ground.

ALPS Resilience is using Brave 14 principles to survey and collect data on the state of affairs in selected areas of the conflict affected province of Cabo Delgado in Northern Mozambique. It is still early times and the initial body of collected data appears to suggest contradictions in oft-stated trends or phenomena compared to surveyed matters on selected indicators. The projected IDP numbers appear to be too low. This also goes for vacated homes as some homes do not fall within the affected areas. In addition, trust in government appears weak while a possible balkanization of demographics is taking place – including religious patterns. One major finding is that statistics have to be refined and supported through a further wave of surveys in selected areas. Particular areas in the Cabo Delgado province form part of the follow-up survey in an attempt to augment data collected earlier to make possible more accurate interpretations of the state of affairs in the province.