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PAPER 01: The Evolution of Support for Democratic Regime Principles and its Alternatives

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Abstract: The aim of this paper is to examine the claim that "most people in almost every country worldwide prefer democracy over other types of regimes" against new data, so as to add to the global map of popular perceptions about their support for various regime types. We describe measured changes in levels of public support in 49 countries over four waves of the World Values Survey on three levels: country specific, regional/continental and global. We found that levels of support for democracy are high and stable across most parts of the world; however, support for various alternate (authoritarian) regimes types is steadily increasing and could threaten the extent to which democratic values are entrenched, especially in younger democracies. We conclude with an overview of some of the factors that could plausibly shape such perceptions at the level of the general citizenry.

Introduction

Confidence in the virtues of democracy and about its popular endorsement as a regime type in competition with its alternatives is wavering among some opinion leaders[1], and possibly also among the general citizenry of democracies and non-democracies alike. This is not the first time that concerns about this regime type has gained expression, and the contemporary mood bears resemblance to some of the earliest doubts about the inherent resilience of democratic regimes.

It is generally understood that in democratic regimes the final, decisive decision-making power in public affairs is vested not with the rulers, but with the ruled. This defining structural arrangement is legitimized mostly from any combination of either tradition, rational deliberation and/or ideology. This structural distribution of power also gives rise to another defining feature of the process of democracy: support is acquired by persuading, and not by commanding.[2]

Whether institutional rules could be found to provide a stable basis for democratic regimes has been in doubt from its early application in the Greek *Polis*, with the first and primary set of weaknesses were seen to derive from inherent structural design features. In the classic typology of regimes presented by Aristotle, every regime type, including that of democracy was presented in both its virtuous form, where rule was to the benefit of all, and in its degenerate form, where rulers exercised power to their own benefit. In the case of democracy, degeneration was associated with anarchy and chaos.

[1] Marc F. Plattner, "Is democracy in decline?", *Journal of Democracy*, vol. 26, no. 1, January 2015, pp. 5-10.
[2] S. E. Finer, *The History of Government from the Earliest Times, volume 1: Ancient Monarchies and Empires*, Oxford: Oxford University press, 1997, pp. 46-47.

The second weakness was identified within the democratic process. Democratic rulers are to proceed with popular support gained through persuasion. This in turn, is a function of the effective communication of arguments for or against certain policy choices over others. Constructing telling arguments from given facts that are interwoven into popular beliefs and convictions, and skilfully presented as being the most beneficial and most attractive choice, is the practice and art of rhetoric. Democratic pessimists held the view from early on that those citizens over whom democrats rule are peculiarly vulnerable to exploitation through devious rhetoric, which undermines the original structural distribution of power between rulers and those over whom they rule.

Taken together, the viability of democratic regimes were considered with some apprehension, given that many such *poleis* had succumbed to their degenerate form.[3] In the words of S.E. Finer, the following assessment prevailed until about two centuries ago: "For rhetoric read demagogy, for persuasion read corruption, pressure, intimidation, and falsification of the vote. For meetings and assemblies, read tumult and riot. For mature deliberation through a set of revising institutions, read self-division, inconstancy, slowness, and legislative and administrative stultification. And for elections read factional plots and intrigues. These features…were what gave the term 'Republic' a bad name, but made 'Democracy' an object of sheer horror."[4]

Centuries later, especially after experiencing and conquering modern European totalitarian regimes, democracy was again elevated to a highly sought after political system. In a famous comparative assessment Winston Churchill remarked in 1947, shortly after the end of World War II, that: "No one pretends that democracy is perfect and all-wise. Indeed, it has been said that democracy is the worst form of Government except all those other forms that have been tried from time to time."[5]

The aim of this paper is not to construct yet another world map of states by regime type, and to find trends in the movement from one type to another, which is found in the ongoing

[3] Finer, pp. 382-383.
[4] Finer, pp. 46, 47.
[5] Angela Partington, (ed.), *The Oxford Dictionary of Quotations*, Oxford: Oxford University Press, revised Fourth Edition, 1996, p. 202.

research into the newest ripples in the Third Wave of democratization.[6] Some of these studies buttress their findings about the resilience of democracies with reference to levels of public support for democracy: "Surveys show that most people in almost every country worldwide prefer democracy over other types of regimes."[7] The aim is to examine this claim against new data, so as to add to the global map of popular perceptions (as opposed to that of opinion leaders) about their support for various regime types. The aim of this paper is also not to identify and verify any specific causal factor to account for changes in the levels of support for democratic regimes, especially for lower levels of support. We describe measured changes in levels of public support, on three levels: country specific, regional/continental and global. We then provide an overview of some of the factors that could plausibly shape such perceptions at the level of the general citizenry, and present these ideas as potentially useful avenues of research.

Data and selection of cases

Our analysis relies on the data from the last four waves[8] of the World Values Survey (WVS) conducted between 1995 and 2014[9]. The WVS provides a valuable tool with which to analyse the values, beliefs and motivations of ordinary citizens at the mass level over time. The increasingly prominent worldwide values research convincingly shows that changing value patterns have a strong impact on political, economic and social developments within a country.

The WVS is conducted by means of face-to-face interviews in the language of preference of respondents. Probability samples are drawn, with all adult citizens having an equal chance of being selected. The samples are also stratified into homogenous sub-groups defined by various demographic attributes. Since the samples are weighted to the full population and within a statistical margin of error of less than two per cent at 95 per cent confidence level, they are representative of the adult population of a given country.

[6] For a recent example see Steven Levitsky and Lucan Way, "The Myth of Democratic Recession", *Journal of Democracy,* vol. 26, no. 1, January 2015, pp. 45-58.

[7] Jorgen Moller and Svend-Erik Skaaning, "The Third Wave: Inside the Numbers", *Journal of Democracy*, vol. 24, no. 4, October 2013, pp. 97-109, at 106.

[8] Our measurement for regime support was not included in the first two waves of the WVS.

[9] The third wave was conducted between 1995 and 1998; the fourth wave between 1999 and 2004; the fifth wave between 2005 and 2009; and the sixth wave between 2010 and 2014.

The rationale behind the case selection was guided by two criteria related to the availability of WVS data: (1) participation in the most recent (sixth) wave of the survey; and (2) participation in at least one other survey prior to the sixth wave. Having fulfilled these requirements, a total of 49 countries were selected for analysis.

Table 1: Selection of cases

Africa	Algeria, Egypt, Ghana, Morocco, Nigeria, South Africa, Zimbabwe
Americas	Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Mexico, Peru, Trinidad and Tobago, United States, Uruguay
Middle East and Asia	Armenia, Azerbaijan, China, Georgia, Hong Kong, India, Iraq, Japan, Jordan, Kyrgyzstan, Malaysia, Pakistan, Philippines, Singapore, South Korea, Taiwan, Thailand
Oceania	Australia, New Zealand
Europe	Belarus, Cyprus, Estonia, Germany, Netherlands, Poland, Romania, Russia, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, Turkey, Ukraine

Measurement

Bratton, Mattes and Gyimah-Boadi (2005:69) argue that widespread popular support for democracy is "loose, sometimes contradictory, formative, perhaps temporary, and based on experience with hybrid regimes that have not completed the process of democratisation". These arguments are made with reference to five claims, namely that liberalisation does not equal democratisation; popular understandings of democracy are malleable; pockets of authoritarian nostalgia remain; rejection of authoritarianism does not amount to support for democracy; and attachments to democracy may decay over time.

In order to measure changes in regime support, respondents were asked the following questions: "I'm going to describe various types of political systems and ask what you think about each as a way of governing this country. For each one, would you say it is a very good, fairly good, fairly bad or very bad way of governing this country?"

1. Having a strong leader who does not have to bother with parliament and elections.
2. Having experts, not government, make decisions according to what they think is best for the country.
3. Having the army rule.
4. Having a democratic political system.

From these political systems, we are able to gauge popular support for democracy as well as authoritarian sentiments (support for a dictatorship, technocracy and military rule) and the extent to which this support has increased or decreased over time. We understand regime

support to encompass both support for a democratic political system as well as a rejection of authoritarian alternatives. Of particular importance are variables 1 and 2 above, which measure respondents support for a dictatorship and technocracy opposed to democracy (parliament, government and elections).

Findings

At the global level, explicit support for a democratic political system is high (89.1% in wave 6) and remained relatively stable across all 49 countries over the four time periods under investigation (see Table 2 below). However, this explicit support for democracy has been accompanied by a surge of support for alternate regime types. A majority of respondents (56.1%) indicated that expert rule; i.e. having experts rather than government make decisions according to what they think is best for a country is a good political system for their respective countries. More than two in every five respondents support having a strong leader who does not have to bother with democratic procedures and practices such as holding elections or constituting a parliament; while one in every five respondents support military rule. The levels of support for these alternate regime types have steadily increased between waves 3 and 6.

Table 2: Support for various types of political systems, 1995 – 2014

All 49 countries	Wave3	Wave4	Wave5	Wave6	Change
Democratic political system	88.5	91.3	91.6	89.1	**0.6**
Expert rule	52.6	47.5	58.1	56.1	**3.5**
Rule by strong leader	35.8	38.4	35.3	41.0	**5.2**
Army rule	17.2	20.6	21.3	20.4	**3.2**

At the regional level, support for democracy is high across all five regions. Support for democracy was highest amongst African states (91.9%) and "lowest" in the Middle East and Asia (85.4%) during wave 6 of the WVS. The majority of respondents in Africa (54.7%), the Middle East and Asia (55.2%), the Americas (59.1%) and Europe (63.6%) support rule by experts, while 47.9% of respondents in Oceania countries (Australia and New Zealand) agree. Support for rule by a strong leader was strongest in the Middle East and Asia (49.5%) and the Americas (47.8%) and weakest in Oceania (25.0%). Support for military rule, on the other hand, was strongest in Africa (30.4%) and the Middle East and Asia (28.8%) and weakest in Europe (12.4%) and Oceania (6.0%).

Having a democratic political system

In all five global regions the level of support for democracy is very high (see Table 1 in Appendix). The country with the lowest score is Kyrgyzstan (71.9%) in the Middle East and Asia. Another notably low score from the same region is India (73.1%). In Africa, South Africans show the lowest support for democracy at 72.0%, while Russians have the lowest score in Europe (79.7%). In North, South and Central America, the USA has the lowest support with 82.3%.

We are also interested in the most notable swings towards or away from support for democracy. In terms of the increase in support for democracy, three countries are worth mentioning: Russia, Pakistan and Chile. Support for democracy in Russia increased by 22.1% from 57.6% in the third wave to 79.7% in the sixth wave; followed by an 11.2% increase in Pakistan and 10.2% increase in Chile to reach 79.1% and 95.7% in the sixth wave respectively. Overall, support for democracy increased in only 20 of the 49 countries under investigation. For the remaining 29 countries which experienced a decline in popular support for democracy amongst its citizens, there are five cases that should be highlighted: the biggest loss of popular support is evidenced in South Africa (by 18.9%) and India (by 18.8%), followed by Azerbaijan (14.1%), South Korea (9.4%) and the USA (8.2%). Oceania, comprising of Australia and New Zealand are generally of little interest in this category, showing consistently high support for democracy, with no notable swings. Likewise, Europe is steady at a high level of democratic support, with the only exception being the upswing of support in Russia.

Having the army rule

Our European cases and Oceania show low levels of support for this option, and little movement. The strongest support is found in Romania (31.7%) and Turkey (30.1%) in wave 6. By contrast, significant movement is found in the cases from the Middle East and Asia. The biggest decline in support for rule by the army is in Jordan, where it fell from 57.7% in wave 4 to 28.6% in wave 6, a drop of 19.1%. This is closely followed by China, with a 27% drop to 17.8% from wave 4 to wave 6. The most significant increase in support is found in the two old adversaries, India and Pakistan. In Pakistan support for military rule rose from 41.5 % in wave 3 to 61.3% in wave 6, a rise of 19.8%. In India the rise is even steeper, from 36.6% in wave 3 to a high of 74.6% in wave 6, an increase of no less than 38%. These two

countries also have the highest levels of support, respectively, for the military option within their region.

In the Americas the highest level of support, and also the biggest change in favour of rule by the military, is found in Mexico. Levels of support for this option rose by 26.2% between waves 3 and 6, up to the level of 52.6%. Chile a notable case of democratic transition after military rule is one where sentiment moves in the opposite direction. Support for military rule dropped from 30.8% in wave 3 to 17.9% in wave 6, a decline of 12.9%.

In our African set of cases South Africa is again significant. Support for having the army rule rose from 24.5% in wave 3, to just over the halfway level at 50.4% in in wave 6, an increase of 25.9 percentage points. In Nigeria, an African country with some of the most vivid experiences of rule by the army, by contrast, support is low and remains there. In wave 3 31.4% of respondents supported it, and by wave 6 support had risen only 8.4% to 39.8%.

Having a strong leader who does not have to bother with parliament and elections
Egypt is the eye-catching case among African nations. In wave 3 only 7.7% of respondents indicated support for rule by a strong leader at the expense of an elected parliament. Support then rose dramatically by 86% to end at a level of 93.7% support in wave 6. The other significant case is, again, South Africa. Support for this option rose from 34.4% in wave 3 to 60.3% in wave 6, an increase of 25.9%. Algeria presents the case with the strongest move away from rule by a strong unelected leader. Support declined from 33.1% in wave 4 to 22.9% in wave 6, a drop of 16.2%.

Most of the cases in the Americas indicated small increases in support for this option, even in the USA. The lone exception being Trinidad and Tobago. The largest increases are in Argentina, where it rose from 29.3% in wave 3 to 50.3% in wave 6, an increase of 21%, and in Peru. Here support for the strong leader option rose from 34.8% to 60.4%, the highest level in the Americas, and an increase of 25.6%.

In the Middle East and Asia all the big states show significant movement. In China support for this option rose by 23.3%, from 18.5% in wave 4 to 41.8 % in wave 6. In Russia, already at a high level of 50.4% in wave 3, the level of support increased even more, by 25.3% to the level of 75.7% in wave 6. By contrast, in India support for rule by a strong leader remains

steady at a high level, shifting marginally from 68% in wave 3 to 71.4% in wave 6. Two smaller countries in this group also gain attention. In Singapore the 50% threshold is crossed, with support moving from 22.6% in wave 4 to 50.5% in wave 6. Thailand is the case with the biggest movement in sentiment in this group. The measured support for the strong leader option was high in wave 5 at 70.8% but in the very next wave of the WVS it plummeted by 40% to the level of 30.8%.

In Europe and Oceania support for this regime principle is uneven, with Romania, Ukraine and Turkey showing more than 50% support, with a rising trend in every case. Ukraine has the highest level of support at 71.3%. Romania shows the strongest movement, from 47.2% in wave 3 to 74.8% in wave 6, the highest level of all the countries in this group.

Having experts, not government, make decisions according to what they think is best for the country.

Respondents in African states show notable differences in response to this option. In Algeria, support for this option plummeted from 80.5% in wave 4 to 40.6% in wave 6, a decline of 39.9%. In Egypt, the other Mediterranean African state in our data set, sentiment moved in the opposite direction. In wave 4 a 67.1% level of support was found. This rose by 20.9% to a new level of 88% in wave 6, the highest among the African countries surveyed. South Africa also moved significantly from a 48.9% level of support in wave 3 to 66.9% in wave 6.

Brazil (82.5%), Mexico (70.4%) and Peru (68.3%) show the highest levels of support in the Americas. The strongest movement in the direction of rising support for this option does, however, come from the USA, increasing from 36.8% in wave 3 to 51.2% in wave 6, up 14.4%.

In the Middle East and Asia some strong movements in both directions are registered. India (81.3%) and Iraq (73%) have the highest levels of support for rule by experts in this region. The largest movement in favour of this set of regime principles is found in Azerbaijan, where the level of support in wave 3 was at 1.6%, but rocketed up to 62.8% in wave 6. Pakistan follows with a rise of 48.2%, having moved from a level of 18.9% support in wave 4 up to 67.1% in wave 6. The most significant decline in support is found in Jordan, where levels of support dropped from 88.4% in wave 4 to 51% in wave 6, a decline of 37.4%.

In Oceania the option of rule by experts gains the second highest level of support after that of a democratic system, well above that for a strong leader (with support levels in the mid-20s) and military rule (below 10%). In Australia support for this option breaches the 50% level at 52.6%, a 10.4% rise from the level measured in wave 3 (42.2%). Support for rule by experts in New Zealand is steady, with a 43.2% level in wave 6.

This ordering of preferences is repeated in Europe, with rule by experts taking a clear second preference after democratic rule, and ahead of rule by a strong leader or the army. The lowest level of support for this option is found, not surprisingly, in Sweden (38.7% in wave 6), and the highest in Romania (84.4% in wave 6). Romania also shows the most significant move in favour of this option, having levels of support increase by 35.3% from the level of 49.1% in wave 3.

Findings from a few key states

Some states in this data set are significant within their regions for a variety of reasons. In Africa Nigeria and South Africa are the dominant economic powers in the continent, with both also being important instances of democratic transition in the Third Wave.

In the Americas Argentina and Brazil demand attention for sheer size, and for their apparent democratic brittleness. Chile is a shining example of a successful Third Wave democracy, and the USA remains the regional and global dominant state in virtually all aspects – economic ascendancy, military power, democratic longevity, and technological and cultural innovation. Mexico has become a very important case, not only for having emerged from the longest period of dominant-party rule (71 years), but also because of the contest for military and political supremacy between the state and rival criminal syndicates.

In the Middle East and Asia the two cases of China and India dominate through sheer population size alone. India also commands attention by virtue of being the world's largest democracy, and China as the second largest economy in the world, which is being achieved under a completely undemocratic communist single-party regime and its own unique version of state capitalism. Russia, a former communist super power, a former imperial power, and a former democracy still holds a global presence, especially with its newly assertive policies under President Putin. Pakistan, the immediate neighbour of India is a pivotal state in many ways. It has a very unstable constitutional history, lurching from military rule to democracy

and back, is armed with nuclear weapons, has a history of conflict with India, and has to confront an insurgent Taliban movement on its border with Afghanistan.

Oceania and Europe hold some of the most stable democracies, while the European set of cases also have some marginal democracies in Turkey and Ukraine, and some outright authoritarian post-communist regimes.

When we compare the profiles of some of these states on all four indicators (see Table 3) the following emerges. Firstly, the most comprehensive decline in regime support for democracy is found in South Africa. On all four indicators major shifts in attitudes are found, with the biggest shifts are in favour of having the army rule (25.9% change) and rule by a strong leader (25.9% change). Support for democracy is still the option with the highest level of support (72%) but now only 12 percentage points above the option of rule by experts. South Africa compares poorly with Nigeria, who records far more stable support for democracy, and at higher/lower levels on all four indicators.

Table 3: Results from 13 key states

Country		Democracy	Army rule	Expert rule	Strong leader
Nigeria	Wave 6	91.8	39.8	6.0	42.2
	Change	-0.4	8.4	-0.3	6.4
South Africa	Wave 6	72.0	50.4	66.9	60.3
	Change	-18.9	25.9	18.0	25.9
Brazil	Wave 6	85.2	34.9	82.5	68.5
	Change	-5.2	-0.3	4.7	4.7
Chile	Wave 6	95.7	17.9	48.8	37.4
	Change	10.8	-12.9	4.5	2.2
Mexico	Wave 6	84.4	52.6	70.4	58.7
	Change	7.2	26.2	8.8	12.2
United States	Wave 6	82.3	17.5	51.2	35.0
	Change	-8.2	11.0	14.4	10.1
China	Wave 6	90.8	17.8	37.9	41.8
	Change	-5.5	-27.0	7.7	23.3
India	Wave 6	73.1	74.6	81.3	71.4
	Change	-18.8	38.0	14.7	3.4
Pakistan	Wave 6	79.1	61.3	67.1	47.2
	Change	11.2	19.8	48.2	-16.5
Russia	Wave 6	79.7	16.1	65.9	75.7
	Change	22.1	-4.9	6.7	25.3
Germany	Wave 6	95.3	4.1	59.1	21.6
	Change	-0.5	2.6	-3.6	7.9
Sweden	Wave 6	96.0	9.2	38.7	27.5
	Change	0.3	5.4	-0.4	1.1
Turkey	Wave 6	90.2	30.1	59.8	59.1

	Change	1.1	-2.3	4.4	18.3

This significant decline in support for democracy in South Africa should be read with trends in other indicators of political culture in the country. The various indicators of social trust and social tolerance paint a conflicting picture. Levels of social tolerance in the sixth wave were high and stable as South Africans reported to be tolerant of people of another race group (80.8%); people of another religion (84.0%) and people who speak another language (84.9%). Tolerance of immigrants or foreign workers however is far lower and declining, from 75% in the fifth wave to 59.1% in the sixth wave of the WVS. Social trust is also low. Less than a quarter (23.6%) of South Africans believe that most people can be trusted (generalised trust). The measures of interpersonal trust show that the majority of South Africans trust people of a different religion to themselves (56.6%) and a different race group (51.7%). However, less than half trust people of a different nationality (48.7%), strangers (40.1%) and immigrants or foreign workers (30.9%).

The second notable set of cases is those of India and Pakistan. In India three of the four indicators measure a decline in support for democracy and a rise in support for its alternatives. Support for democracy is down by 18.8%, and support for rule by the army has increased by a huge 38%. Support for rule by experts has increased by 14.7% to the very high level of 81.3%. It is significant that India is the only case in this table where support for democracy is only the third most popular option, and only just, with rule by experts and by the army both gaining more support. In comparison, India's next door neighbour Pakistan, shows a higher level of support for democracy, and a rising trend with an 11.2% increase in support. As with India however, support for rule by the army has increased, and rule by experts also gained more support, a huge shift of 48.2%. In contrast with India however, support for rule by a strong leader has declined by 16.5% to below the 50% level.

Discussion

The most striking feature of the data is the relative rise in support for the three alternative regime types to that of democracy presented to the WVS respondents: rule by the military, rule by experts, and especially, rule by a strong leader who is not constrained by representative institutions. This raises three questions: first, what is it about these three regime types that can account for their relative rise in popularity; second, what is it about the democratic regime type that can account for the instances where the support for democracy

has actually declined significantly, and thirdly, what kind of contextual factors can contribute to the attitudinal shifts we report above.

We identify three general sets of factors that could plausibly have shaped these attitudinal changes among the public of the countries in the WVS. The first emerges from internal design of both democracies and authoritarian regimes. The second arises from the process that is generated within democratic institutions, and especially from the role of new technology in this democratic process. The third is a contextual factor, which is again crucially shaped by modern ideas and modern technology.

The first such factor is in design, with the apparent susceptibility of democratic rulers to the temptation to use their power to benefit themselves, after having been duly authorized through the representative process to rule to the benefit of all, thus corrupting the entire system of rule. This is a well-known problem, and stated in Lord Acton's dictum, it can be taken as a constant attribute of humanity, rather than a variable. The enduring question is how to strengthen democracies against such corrosion; through structure, culture, or some mixture of both. The doctrine and practice of the rule of law can be considered as an ongoing project in building structures that hopefully can shape culture into civic cultures, so as to contain these corrupting effects of power.

Arguably the most damaging recent instance of corruption for democracy at the global level has been the financial crisis of 2007/8, which started in the financial system of the USA with the collapse of the Lehman Brothers bank, and then spread to the EU zone. Generally understood as a crisis not only of financial, but also of democratic political institutions and leadership, created by the major players inside this system, this not only discredited the capitalist economic system, but also democracy.[10] The crisis contributed to the long-standing criticism that liberal democracies tend to rely on the economic system of capitalism that is inherently unstable, and prone to crisis conditions. These recurring events then undermine the claim that these democracies provide the most viable route to prosperity for its citizenry. With China as the towering example, authoritarian regimes have increasingly claimed to be more adept at generating growth and prosperity. In addition, capitalism's critics claim that this economic system is deemed to be, in principle, low in legitimacy, as it is based on private

[10] Plattner, "Is Democracy in Decline?" p. 8.

property, capital accumulation, market pricing and profit maximization, leading to cumulative systemic socio-economic inequalities.

The legitimacy of democratic regimes have not only been deeply undermined by financial crises of the type mentioned above, but also by persistent instances of corruption by elected public officials. Even where such corruption cannot be decisively verified, the suspicion of corrupt dealings has become so widespread that perceptions of corruption have tainted many a politician, irrespective of his/her track record. The further effect has been that the institution of representative government itself has come to be even more tainted.

This has given rise to the phenomenon of "anti-politics" candidates, who by their very participation ridicule the system of representation. An early example was in 2013 in the general election in Italy. One of the new parties contesting the elections was the Five Star Movement, (M5S) lead by Beppe Grillo, a well-known comedian, blogger, actor and political activist. He did not run as a candidate himself, but took a principled anti-establishment stand, refusing to commit to rule in any future coalition government. His party, with deft use of social media platforms drew more than 8 million votes, at 25.6% of the vote for the Chamber of Deputies, the second highest of all parties. After the election M5S stayed true to its promise, and refused to join any ruling coalition.[11]

Another more recent example is in Guatemala. One of the candidates, professional television comedian Jimmy Morales, entered the Presidential campaign in 2015 with virtually no experience of politics. He nonetheless declared himself well equipped for the role, stating blandly, that he was "neither corrupt nor a thief", and that his lack of political connections left him best placed to confront corruption. On October 25th he won the Presidency with a landslide victory, taking almost 70% of the vote in a run-off election.[12]

The question remains of course whether rulers in any other types of regime would be less or more vulnerable to the insidious effects of power. As expressly stated in Churchill's observation, these are certainly equally if not more prone to corruption. But is there

[11] Aldo Di Virgilio and Daniela Gianetti, "The General election in Italy, February 2013", *Electoral Studies*, vol. 34, 2014, pp. 291-379.
[12] *Economist*, October 21st, 2015, p. 41.

something else about the design of authoritarian regimes that would conceivably make them more attractive than before?

Broadly considered, democracies can be described as being systems of rule that institutionalize uncertainty, in contrast with authoritarian regimes that, in design at least, amount to un-institutionalized uncertainty. Democracies institutionalize uncertainty to the extent that they are designed to establish and uphold enduring public persuasion through open contestation by stakeholders for public approval. In the modern democracies this arena is primarily that of the institutions of electoral politics, with free, fair, and regularly repeated elections augmented by ongoing intra-elite bargaining within representative assemblies. Uncertainty is inherent to this form of contestation, given that in no election can results, in principle at least, be predicted with full accuracy. [13] Intra-elite bargaining, likewise, is always conducted within an environment of incomplete information, constitutional rules notwithstanding, thus generating yet more uncertainty.[14] In authoritarian regimes uncertainty prevails by virtue of the absence of formal rules that limit ruler's exercise of choice. Their discretion can be the function of personal rule, where whim, expedience and arbitrariness is at best constrained only by informal understandings with other stakeholders.

An authoritative analysis of actual regime performance by Alexander, has however shown great variation of rule within both regime types.[15] Some authoritarian rulers have actually produced stable, and fairly predictable environments over extended periods of time, with the contemporary "Asian Tigers" in their authoritarian phases as examples, others have produced the expected instability of rulers who act without constraining rules. Some democracies have succeeded in producing rule based government, and contained themselves within extensive systems of rule of law. Others have succumbed to rule-based instability, such as the "feckless pluralism" [16] that arises when one set of corrupt rulers get voted out only to be replaced by another set of elected representatives who eventually show themselves to be equally prone to corrupt practices; and the problems of perennially unstable coalition governments, or even

[13] Adam Przeworski, *Democracy and the Market*, Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 1991.
[14] See Zachary Elkins, Tom Ginsberg and James Melton, *The Endurance of National Constitutions*, New York: Cambridge University Press, 2009, at 66-73.
[15] Gerard Alexander, "Institutionalized Uncertainty, the Rule of Law, and the Sources of Democratic Instability", *Comparative Political Studies*, vol. 35, no. 10, December 2012, pp. 1145-1170.
[16] Thomas Carothers, "The End of the Transition Paradigm", *Journal of Democracy*, vol. 13, no. 1, January 2002, pp. 5-21.

worse, the problems of elections that produce no winners and hence, no government, as happened to Belgium who spent 541 days in 2010/2011 in this condition.

The conclusion is that the answer to the issue of uncertainty and instability of authoritarian regimes has to be an answer in every individual case to the question "authoritarianism under whom?", and likewise in democracies, with an answer to the question "democracy with whom?"[17] Alexander follows this conclusion with a proposition that bears directly on our analysis: "If predictability of (or risks) outcomes vary at least as much within regime types as across them, then *we should expect actors to shift regime preferences as circumstances warrant rather than always preferring one regime type*"[18] (emphasis added).

The questionnaire item about democracy and its alternatives presented to the WVS respondents and responses to it can be considered against these findings. The options of rule by the military, rule by experts and rule by a strong leader who is unconstrained by parliaments and elections are obviously authoritarian regime types. What is important here is to note how these options are presented. The item describing military rule is bland, and is open to whatever view the respondent may have of military types. In the other two options the rulers are not presented to the respondents with any hint of personal weaknesses, flaws or disabilities. As an alternative to democracy, both these regime types are presented in their unsullied form, and the incumbents are without degenerate attributes. The option of "experts", is unqualified: they are not presented as "presumed" experts, or "self-declared' experts, or as fakes, "would-be" experts or as pretenders, "wanna-be" experts. Instead they are presented to the respondent as the real thing – those with specialist knowledge on issues that matter. Likewise, the strong leader in the questionnaire item is not presented as being equally fallible as the rest of humanity, or as even slightly prone to the corrupting effects of power. For the these two options the answer to the question "authoritarianism under whom', can then plausibly be met with a positive response, depending on whether the circumstances of the respondents are perceived as such as to call for specialist knowledge or bold leadership. And, with the rise of the anti-politics candidates, whether comedian/actor/activist or not, increasingly, a positive answer to the question of "democracy with whom" cannot be taken as a given.

[17] Alexander, "Institutionalized Uncertainty", pp. 1157, 1164.
[18] Alexander, Institutionalized Uncertainty, p. 1165.

The second possible factor affecting regime preferences can be found the democratic process, the politics of persuasion, and its degenerate form, the politics of demagoguery. One major difference between the contemporary contexts and ancient democracies is found in the level of technology that is available to actors in the process of democratic persuasion. Representative as well as direct democracy has gained from the technologies ranging from print media through to television by which ever greater numbers of citizens could be accommodated within the public sphere, and provided many new opportunities for citizen engagement. With these technologies, and especially with the use of the printed media in the late 19th and twentieth centuries, new imagined communities could be constructed, especially that of the nation, for whom it became possible to visualize themselves as being a social entity more or less aligned with the territorial jurisdiction of the state.[19] The positive effect of creating democratic nations and cohesive civil societies needs to be considered against what the most infamous demagogues of the twentieth century did with these same technologies. Hitler's infamous Nuremberg rallies of the 1930s are a spectacular case in point, and remains deeply etched in the Western memory.

The emergence of the Internet is a new technology platform that promised much in this regard,[20] but delivered less. According expert analysis, it did not create a "New Economy", or a world community, or narrow the wealth gap, or spread democracy.[21] The initial expectation was that social media would contribute significantly to revitalize established democracies, and contribute to the expansion of the Third Wave of further democratization. The skill with which the Obama campaign used social media in his 2008 election campaign was a promising early indicator of this.

The Arab Spring of 2011, and the Occupy Wall Street movement of 2012 offered more positive indicators of a new form of political action growing from social media platforms. The Arab Spring, with the lone exception of Tunisia, has reversed in a decisive swing state such as Egypt, and stalled in civil war in Libya and Syria. Social media played crucial roles in mobilizing citizens against oppressive authoritarians in Libya, Syria and Egypt, but failed to contribute to achieving democracy in any of these states, let alone securing it.

[19] Benedict Anderson, *Imagined Communities. Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism*, London: Verso, revised edition 2006.
[20] Larry Diamond, "Liberation Technology", *Journal of Democracy*, vol. 21, no. 3, 2010.
[21] Karl Albrecht, "The Information revolution's broken promises", *The Futurist*, vol. 48, no. 2.

Here the politics of persuasion took a different turn. Events have shown that demagogues can and do use social media platforms on the Internet, but exploit these platforms in a very new way. Social media not only effectively mobilized citizens against authoritarian rulers in countries such as Egypt, Syria and Libya, but it also fractured this mass of individuals into new networks, distinct from one another in identity and cause, politically polarized and hostile to exchanging information with one another.[22] In effect social media communication networks rapidly gravitated to what Marc Lynch describes as "echo chambers", where likeminded individuals clustered together to form in-groups with a very high demand for conformity. This conformity was achieved in an environment where extremist views gained more response than moderate considered opinions, and formed a critical mass of informational clustering driven by sloganeering rather than deliberation.

The resultant self-selection in internal communication then became biased towards these extreme positions, a new form of demagoguery, and out-group hostility increased accordingly. According to Lynch social media platforms have shown themselves to be very vulnerable to the cultivation of a sense of victimized, aggrieved identity, and a corresponding rage against out-groups. This process is facilitated by the ease with which rumours can circulate on these platforms, and with which fear can be spread among large sectors of any population. The public sphere of the social media thus created not new imagined communities with which to initiate new or rejuvenate established democratic institutions, but rather new deeply divided societies, highly unfavourable to the process of democratization. This opened up space for authoritarian forces to regain the initiative and to re-occupy the political centre, most effectively so in Egypt.

The last set of factors that can be considered as detrimental to the standing of the democratic regime model against its competitors is contextual and addresses the circumstances mentioned above which may generate the call for decisive unconstrained leadership and specialist knowledge, and in which democracies are considered to perform poorly. We find this in the rising challenge to the physical security of democratic citizens presented by international terrorism. The question of whether states can continue to uphold constitutionally guaranteed civil liberties while meeting the challenge of terrorists who use and abuse these very liberties to gain access to their targets within democratic societies is a long-standing one.

[22] Marc Lynch, "How the Media trashed the Transitions", Journal of Democracy, vol. 26, no. 4, October 2015.

Events starting with the attack on the World Trade Centre in New York on September 11, 2001, and subsequent urban terror attacks in London, Madrid and Paris have made this issue even more urgent.

The immediate response to the September 11 2001 attack by President George W. Bush was to launch the War on Terror, which amongst other aspects also focussed on closing down the space for civil society organizations, who were immediately seen as Trojan Horses for terrorists to gain access to democracies.[23] This has become, according to one author, a generally accepted norm for targeted countries who sense themselves to be in an "international state of emergency": to choose in favour of security concerns when it has to be traded off against civil liberties.[24]

The new levels of technology made available through the Internet has also complicated this issue, again with implications for democratic regimes. Firstly, although the Internet was originally constructed as a platform of open communication, states, both democratic and authoritarian, have mastered these technologies as a medium of surveillance over its citizens, international allies and enemies alike. This has led to the increasing balkanization of the Internet, and its decline as a site of public expression that exists beyond the reach of the state system.[25] Secondly, terror movements are themselves using social media to some effect, either as a platform for propaganda, or as a vehicle for recruitment. Thirdly, citizens who voluntarily place large amounts of personal information on social media sites have become active participants in eroding their own privacy, a vital civil liberty. All three of these factors highlight the threat that some kinds of use of the Internet can pose to upholding democratic rights.

These factors can become deeply interwoven in the context within which many of the WVS respondents find themselves. We can only briefly mention two adjoining states of India and Pakistan by way of illustration. India has a meritorious record of democratic rule, marred only by emergency rule under Prime Minister Indira Ghandi from 1975 to 1979. During its democratic era India has moved from a dominant-party system to a multi-party system, and

[23] Douglas Rutzen, "Civil Society under Assault", *Journal of Democracy*, vol. 26, no. 4, October 2015. Pp. 28-39.
[24] Alexander Cooley, "Countering Democratic Norms", *Journal of Democracy*, vol. 26, no. 3, July 2015, pp. 49-63, at 50, 51.
[25] Eric Schmidt and Jared Cohen, *The New Digital Age. Reshaping the future of People, Nations and Business*, New York: Alfred E. Knopf, 2013.

has extended the franchise and the delivery of public goods through to many of the marginalized communities in the country. Pakistan has had a far more turbulent and unstable political history since independence. Military rule, interspersed with bouts of democracy has been the recurring pattern, yet support for democracy is now (wave 6 of the WVS) higher among Pakistani respondents than those in India. And in India such support is in decline.

Support for military rule is on the rise in both countries, especially in India, where respondents have never experienced it. Still, experience of military rule has not made it an altogether distasteful regime option in Pakistan. Given their nuclear military capabilities, their ethnic differences and their history of conflict these trends are significant, even unsettling for the prospects of democracy within the sub-continent.

To that one should add the continued volatility of the region. Pakistan borders Iran and Afghanistan, both deeply drawn into the tensions of the Middle East. In Afghanistan the American military withdrawal has been put on hold (as announced by President Obama in October 2015), and the return of the Taliban as a military and political force does not bode well for democracy or stability in that country, with likely adverse consequences for Pakistan. India borders China, with whom it has a number of ongoing border disputes, Nepal, which has experienced almost chronic internal upheaval for more than a decade, Myanmar and Bangladesh. The latter country is a tipping point in more ways than one. It is recognised as one of the most environmentally vulnerable countries in the world, being exposed to rising ocean levels, flooding from monsoon and hurricane weather as well as tide surges (in 1998 more than one third of the country was under water for some time after disastrous floods). It is also a densely populated country with a high growth rate, making it a potential source of huge numbers of climate refugees moving into India.[26]

While perceptions of multi-dimensional insecurity may shape support for the military regime type, adverse experiences of democratic rule could also impact on support for democracy. In the 2014 national election the ruling United Progressive Alliance, with the Indian National Congress (INC) as its major stakeholder suffered a landslide defeat to the National

[26] Gordon McGranahan, Deborah Balk and Bridget Anderson, "The rising tide: assessing the risks of climate change and human settlements in low elevation coastal zones", *Environment & Urbanization*, vol. 19, no. 1, April 2007, pp. 17-37, esp. table 3 at p. 26. In 2000 already Bangladesh had 46% of its population (then about 62 million people) living below the Low Elevation Coastal Zone, which is less than 10 metres above sea level.

Democratic Alliance lead by the Bharitiya Janata Party (BJP), in part because of major corruption scandals associated with the INC.[27]

Conclusion

The rise in support for authoritarian regimes could conceivably be related to the rise in perceptions of existential insecurity. Existential insecurity is defined as chronic life-threatening conditions, which in turn, correlates with the overall levels of economic and human development and of economic equality that societies experience.[28] Under these conditions democratic regimes are open to be perceived to perform poorly, and plausibly so, for the following reasons. Firstly, democracies institutionalize uncertainty in that electoral contests are never decisively settled, but go on and on from one election to the next, and the outcome to every election is open to some doubt. This is a viable regime model as long as the process of competitive public persuasion is free from demagoguery, and the duly elected representatives are of a calibre that can and do uphold the rule of law. These conditions are being increasingly undermined by new technology using the Internet as platform, especially social media, which creates new space for demagogues. Also, the politics of representation is losing legitimacy through ongoing corruption scandals involving elected officials, with anti-politics candidates as both a symbol and symptom of such de-legitimization.

The democratic regime model can also seen to be poorly designed to confront some of the sources of existential insecurity, especially those deriving from international terrorism. Institutionalized uncertainty as to policy outcomes that have to address these challenges is also becoming less sustainable with the new levels of technology at the disposal of terror movements. Increasingly the maintenance of civil liberties are curtailed as a response to the perceived systemic brittleness of democracies who have to confront opponents who aim to use these very liberties to strategic advantage. Authoritarian regimes that promise (if not necessarily deliver) more certain outcomes then become more attractive.

[27] Rekha Diwakar, "The 16th general election in India, April-May 2014, *Electoral Studies*, vol. 37, 2015, pp. 120-125. See also Eswaran Sridharan, "Behind Modi's Victory", *Journal of Democracy*, vol. 25, no. 4, October 2014, pp. 20-33.

[28] Pippa Norris and Ronald Inglehart, *Sacred and Secular. Religion and Politics Worldwide*, New York: Cambridge University Press, 2004.

We conclude with the general proposition that under conditions that give rise to perceptions of existential insecurity, generated by a sense of increasing risks and dangers, whether ego-tropic or socio-tropic, citizens are less likely to endorse democratic regimes that, by definition, institutionalize uncertainty as to the outcomes of democratic processes of competitive persuasion. Perceptions of such threats are likely to contribute to attitudes that favour regime types which seem to promise more certainty as to policy making and policy outcomes, whether in the form of executive rule by the military, experts, or strong, yet unaccountable leaders.

This is not in any way to imply that these three alternative regime types are more adept at producing policies that contain or decrease actual or perceived insecurities. They are equally vulnerable to incomplete information, contingencies beyond their own control, and uncertain pay-offs. But it is to say that these type of regimes can be perceived as being free from some of the uncertainties that exacerbate perceptions of existential insecurities, yet that are inherent to democratic processes.

Appendices

Table 1: Support for a democratic political system

	Wave3	Wave4	Wave5	Wave6	Ave. change
All countries	**88.5**	**91.3**	**91.6**	**89.1**	**-8.8**
AFRICA					
Algeria		92.7		90.0	-2.7
Egypt		98.6	98.3	99.0	0.4
Ghana			96.2	95.6	-0.6
Morocco		95.6	96.4	97.9	2.3
Nigeria	92.2	95.3		91.8	-0.4
South Africa	90.9	89.8	90.2	72.0	-18.9
Zimbabwe		88.0		96.8	8.8
REGIONAL AVERAGE	**91.6**	**93.3**	**95.3**	**91.9**	**-11.1**
AMERICAS					
Argentina	92.9	90.6	95.1	91.7	-1.2
Brazil			90.4	85.2	-5.2
Chile	84.9	84.7	92.5	95.7	10.8
Colombia	85.4		86.8	85.7	0.3
Mexico	77.2	86.0	86.2	84.4	7.2
Peru	91.4	93.1	89.2	94.5	3.1
Trinidad and Tobago			89.7	87.9	-1.8
United States	90.5	89.1	85.6	82.3	-8.2
Uruguay	96.1		91.2	95.0	-1.1
REGIONAL AVERAGE	**88.3**	**88.7**	**89.6**	**89.2**	**3.9**
EUROPE					
Belarus	79.8			85.8	6.0
Cyprus			95.1	96.0	0.9
Estonia	88.6			86.6	-2.0
Germany	95.8		95.0	95.3	-0.5
Netherlands			91.7	93.6	1.9
Poland			84.3	83.2	-1.1
Romania	91.4		95.0	87.0	-4.4
Russia	57.6		78.9	79.7	22.1
Slovenia	86.4		87.2	82.1	-4.3
Spain	94.6	95.2	96.2	96.2	1.6
Sweden	95.7		97.9	96.0	0.3
Turkey	89.1	91.9	93.1	90.2	1.1
Ukraine	80.2		80.8	85.3	5.1
REGIONAL AVERAGE	**85.9**	**93.6**	**90.5**	**89.0**	**26.7**
OCEANIA					
Australia	87.3		89.0	89.1	1.8
New Zealand	91.0		94.1	90.6	-0.4
REGIONAL AVERAGE	**89.2**		**91.6**	**89.9**	**1.4**

MIDDLE EAST AND ASIA	Wave3	Wave4	Wave5	Wave6	Change
Armenia	85.0			92.4	7.4
Azerbaijan	97.5			83.4	-14.1
China		96.3	94.2	90.8	-5.5
Georgia	90.6		98.2	89.1	-1.5
Hong Kong			89.5	85.5	-4.0
India	91.9	93.0	91.7	73.1	-18.8
Iraq		91.1	88.4	88.8	-2.3
Japan	90.5	91.9	88.5	87.7	-2.8
Jordan		94.4	96.2	90.1	-4.3
Kyrgyzstan		81.5		71.9	-9.6
Malaysia			91.8	92.8	1.0
Pakistan	67.9	88.1		79.1	11.2
Philippines	84.4	82.4		75.7	-8.7
Singapore		93.9		90.7	-3.2
South Korea	84.6	84.7	77.2	75.2	-9.4
Taiwan	93.1		93.0	93.2	0.1
Thailand			92.6	92.2	-0.4
REGIONAL AVERAGE	**87.3**	**89.7**	**91.0**	**85.4**	**-64.9**

Table 2: Support for military (army) rule

	Wave3	Wave4	Wave5	Wave6	Ave. change
All countries	**17.2**	**20.6**	**21.3**	**20.4**	**18.0**
AFRICA					
Algeria		19.2		23.7	4.5
Egypt			56.6		
Ghana			16.2	19.9	3.7
Morocco		16.1	28.0		
Nigeria	31.4	25.9		39.8	8.4
South Africa	24.5	21.7	32.4	50.4	25.9
Zimbabwe		12.0		18.0	6.0
REGIONAL AVERAGE	**28.0**	**19.0**	**33.3**	**30.4**	**48.5**
AMERICAS					
Argentina	12.9	17.5	11.9	10.9	-2.0
Brazil			35.20	34.9	-0.3
Chile	30.8	24.2	18.9	17.9	-12.9
Colombia	33.6		32.5	33.8	0.2
Mexico	26.4	35.3	41.3	52.6	26.2
Peru	18.0	14.6	31.0	28.1	10.1
Trinidad and Tobago			18.0	14.5	-3.5
United States	6.5	8.8	14.4	17.5	11.0
Uruguay	8.2		11.1	9.2	1.0
REGIONAL AVERAGE	**19.5**	**20.1**	**23.8**	**24.4**	**29.8**
EUROPE					
Belarus	14.4			8.4	-6.0
Cyprus			16.1	9.0	-7.1
Estonia	5.0			4.2	-0.8
Germany	1.5		3.2	4.1	2.6
Netherlands			7.4	2.7	-4.7
Poland			21.4	21.7	0.3
Romania	24.8		20.4	31.7	6.9
Russia	21.0		15.7	16.1	-4.9
Slovenia	6.4		4.5	4.0	-2.4
Spain	9.1	6.6	11.7	7.8	-1.3
Sweden	3.8		4.7	9.2	5.4
Turkey	32.4	30.3	33.7	30.1	-2.3
Ukraine	11.8		23.1	12.7	0.9
REGIONAL AVERAGE	**13.0**	**18.5**	**14.7**	**12.4**	**-13.4**
OCEANIA					
Australia	7.0		7.1	9.4	2.4
New Zealand	2.3		4.0	2.7	0.4
REGIONAL AVERAGE	**4.7**		**5.6**	**6.0**	**2.8**

MIDDLE EAST AND ASIA	Wave3	Wave4	Wave5	Wave6	Change
Armenia	18.6			34.9	16.3
Azerbaijan	2.3			4.2	1.9
China		44.8	37.5	17.8	-27.0
Georgia	11.4		14.1	11.8	0.4
Hong Kong			3.9	15.5	11.6
India	36.6	20.0	36.0	74.6	38.0
Iraq		16.9	17.7	24.8	7.9
Japan	2.5	1.7	2.4	2.7	0.2
Jordan		57.7	76.0	28.6	-29.1
Kyrgyzstan		34.4		40.2	5.8
Malaysia			55.2	40.6	-14.6
Pakistan	41.5	4.2		61.3	19.8
Philippines	53.3	49.3		52.1	-1.2
Singapore		13.2		25.8	12.6
South Korea	5.1	3.9	7.9	7.4	2.3
Taiwan	15.6		14.4	12.7	-2.9
Thailand			53.6	34.7	-18.9
REGIONAL AVERAGE	**20.8**	**24.6**	**29.0**	**28.8**	**23.1**

Table 3: Support for a strong leader who does not have to bother with parliament or elections

	Wave3	Wave4	Wave5	Wave6		Ave. change
All countries	**35.8**	**38.4**	**35.3**	**41.0**		**71.4**
AFRICA						
Algeria		39.1		22.9		-16.2
Egypt		7.7	16.0	93.7		86.0
Ghana			21.9	14.3		14.3
Morocco		19.1		21.5		2.4
Nigeria	35.8	42.6		42.2		6.4
South Africa	34.4	34.2	43.7	60.3		25.9
Zimbabwe		26.8		16.7		-10.1
REGIONAL AVERAGE	**35.1**	**28.3**	**27.2**	**38.8**		**108.7**
AMERICAS						
Argentina	29.3	41.6	40.8	50.3		21.0
Brazil			63.8	68.5		4.7
Chile	35.2	42.9	33.3	37.4		2.2
Colombia	53.5		31.1	55.8		2.3
Mexico	46.5	56.2	58.0	58.7		12.2
Peru	34.8	38.5	46.7	60.4		25.6
Trinidad and Tobago			33.9	24.7		-9.2
United States	24.9	29.6	32.9	35.0		10.1
Uruguay	27.2		38.8	39.3		12.1
REGIONAL AVERAGE	**35.9**	**41.8**	**42.1**	**47.8**		**81.0**
EUROPE						
Belarus	55.2			47.3		-7.9
Cyprus			42.0	34.9		-7.1
Estonia	37.5			32.2		-5.3
Germany	13.7		16.9	21.6		7.9
Netherlands			41.6	33.2		-8.4
Poland			30.5	21.6		-8.9
Romania	47.2		78.2	74.8		27.6
Russia	50.4		56.5	75.7		25.3
Slovenia	24.8		19.7	26.2		1.4
Spain	29.6	19.0	32.6	46.3		16.7
Sweden	26.4		18.0	27.5		1.1
Turkey	40.8	73.1	58.9	59.1		18.3
Ukraine	54.5		64.6	71.3		16.8
REGIONAL AVERAGE	**38.0**	**46.1**	**41.8**	**44.0**		**77.5**
OCEANIA						
Australia	24.9		23.6	27.7		2.8
New Zealand	19.7		18.7	22.2		2.5
REGIONAL AVERAGE	**22.3**		**21.2**	**25.0**		**2.7**

MIDDLE EAST AND ASIA	Wave3	Wave4	Wave5	Wave6		Change
Armenia	53.4			60.1		6.7
Azerbaijan	6.6			22.6		16.0
China		18.5	34.3	41.8		23.3
Georgia	66.1		53.8	60.7		-5.4
Hong Kong			31.7	34.9		3.2
India	68.0	59.1	63.9	71.4		3.4
Iraq		19.8	20.9	34.5		14.7
Japan	32.4	28.0	24.3	35.8		3.4
Jordan		42.0	18.6	42.4		0.4
Kyrgyzstan		60.7		82.3		21.6
Malaysia			60.1	50.4		-9.7
Pakistan	63.7	33.9		47.2		-16.5
Philippines	65.4	62.5		59.8		-5.6
Singapore		22.6		50.5		27.9
South Korea	31.8	28.3	47.6	49.2		17.4
Taiwan	41.0		59.6	67.1		26.1
Thailand			70.8	30.8		-40.0
REGIONAL AVERAGE	**47.6**	**37.5**	**44.1**	**49.5**		**86.9**

Table 4: Support for expert rule

	Wave3	Wave4	Wave5	Wave6		Ave. change
All countries	**52.6**	**47.5**	**58.1**	**56.1**		**23.4**
AFRICA						
Algeria		80.5		40.6		-39.9
Egypt		67.1	84.0	88.0		20.9
Ghana			58.6	49.5		-9.1
Morocco		75.2	81.3	70.6		-4.6
Nigeria	67.3	73.2		6.0		-0.3
South Africa	48.9	52.0	59.8	66.9		18.0
Zimbabwe		69.1		61.3		-7.8
REGIONAL AVERAGE	**58.1**	**69.5**	**70.9**	**54.7**		**-22.8**
AMERICAS						
Argentina	53.5	54.3	47.6	53.7		0.2
Brazil			77.8	82.5		4.7
Chile	44.3	58.5	50.6	48.8		4.5
Colombia	70.9		44.2	67.9		-3.0
Mexico	61.6	66.4	72.8	70.4		8.8
Peru	56.2	62.9	64.8	68.3		12.1
Trinidad and Tobago			50.3	41.5		-8.8
United States	36.8	44.0	45.5	51.2		14.4
Uruguay	39.9		47.9	47.7		7.8
REGIONAL AVERAGE	**51.9**	**57.2**	**55.7**	**59.1**		**40.7**
EUROPE						
Belarus	56.8			57.7		0.9
Cyprus			55.5	54.5		-1.0
Estonia	45.2			63.9		18.7
Germany	62.7		59.4	59.1		-3.6
Netherlands			52.3	60.4		8.1
Poland			84.6	83.5		-1.1
Romania	49.1		76.3	84.4		35.3
Russia	59.2		57.1	65.9		6.7
Slovenia	79.7		78.9	81.8		2.1
Spain	58.7	34.2	42.6	51.9		-6.8
Sweden	39.1		35.9	38.7		-0.4
Turkey	55.4	74.6	69.7	59.8		4.4
Ukraine	61.2		55.2	64.6		3.4
REGIONAL AVERAGE	**56.7**	**54.4**	**60.7**	**63.6**		**66.7**
OCEANIA						
Australia	42.2		45.5	52.6		10.4
New Zealand	43.7		40.1	43.2		-0.5
REGIONAL AVERAGE	**43.0**		**42.8**	**47.9**		**9.9**

MIDDLE EAST AND ASIA	Wave3	Wave4	Wave5	Wave6	Change
Armenia	55.0			44.2	-10.8
Azerbaijan	1.6			62.8	61.2
China		30.2	50.3	37.9	7.7
Georgia	58.2		59.1	39.2	-19.0
Hong Kong			31.3	46.5	15.2
India	66.6	68.0	70.5	81.3	14.7
Iraq		77.6	74.1	73.0	-4.6
Japan	57.3	58.4	53.7	55.9	-1.4
Jordan		88.4	73.8	51.0	-37.4
Kyrgyzstan		66.0		52.8	-13.2
Malaysia			73.0	63.8	-9.2
Pakistan		18.9		67.1	48.2
Philippines	63.4	62.3		55.8	-7.6
Singapore		39.9		55.7	15.8
South Korea	65.6	52.8	52.4	53.6	-12.0
Taiwan	59.9		65.8	64.7	4.8
Thailand			63.1	33.2	-29.9
REGIONAL AVERAGE	**53.5**	**56.3**	**60.6**	**55.2**	**22.5**